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I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H 
DON WILLIAMSON and JODIE K. ) 
WILLIAMSON, 
) • ' . . • 
Pla int i f f s and Respondents, 
) 
v s . Case No. 14076 
) 
GEORGE R. WANLASS and LORNA L. 
WANLASS, ) 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE: 
This is an appeal from a decision and order of the First 
Judicial District Court awarding plaintiffs judgment in the amount 
of $18,023.50 for default on a contract by the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
v
 This case was tried before the court sitting without a jury; 
the Honorable Judge VeNoy Christoffersen, presiding, judgment was 
granted for plaintiffs in the amount of $18,023.50 plus interest at 
the rate of 5 1/2 percent per annum from July 1, 1973, to date of 
judgment plus attorneys fees in the amount of $2,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL: 
Respondents request that this court sustain the lower court's 
decision and order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS; 
On May 1, 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Wanlass, hereinafter referred to 
as the buyers, purchased a farm from Mr. and Mrs. Williamson, herein-
after referred to as the sellers. The buyers financed most of the 
purchase price through a banking institution, but they financed 
$20,000.00 of the sale price by giving the sellers a $20,000.00 
installment note (See plaintiff's Exhibit #2). 
The note provided that monthly payments of $163.42 were to 
be made on the 1st day of each month. The note also provided that 
the makers, (the buyers) 
"waive presentment for payment and notice of 
non-payment of this note." 
The note further provided: 
"if any installment is not paid at the time it 
becomes due the holders of this note, at their 
option, may declare the whole due and payable 
% .." 
The buyers were late on 15 of the 25 payments made (T.71). 
The sellers were depending upon the payments to be timely made in 
order to pay obligations they had (T.60). 
On at least two separate occasions Mrs. Williamson (seller) 
telephoned Mrs. Wanlass (buyer) to tell her that the payments must 
be made on the due dates. (T.114-115). 
On February 20, 1973, the sellers, also, had their attorney 
' ~ 2 - • 
send a letter and notice to the buyers advising them that payments 
must be made on time and that if the buyers were late the sellers could 
"declare the full amount due and payable, which if they are aggravated 
"declare the full amount due and payable, which if they are aggravated, 
they will pursue." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
On August 3, 1973, a notice of default was sent to the buyers 
notifying them that the entire amount was declared due and payable 
for failure to make payments for July and August, 1973. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #3). 
Following this notice, a suit was brought and the parties 
stipulated that the note would be sued upon without any requirement 
to foreclose any collateral forming security to the note, and 
the defendants also waived any right they had under the requirements to 
foreclose under the one-action rule for real estate mortgages. 
(See T. 3-6). 
The Trial Court listened to the testimony given by the 
witnesses and viewed the exhibits and other evidence, and the 
Tftal Court was familiar with the Memoranda of Points and Author-
ities filed by each party, and the Trial Court, after making its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs. 
POINT I 
THE CASES DEALING WITH FORFEITURES AND 
FORECLOSURES UNDER UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACTS HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THIS 
CASE SINCE IT IS A SUIT TO ENFORCE A 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
The defendants cite LaMont v. Evjen, 29 U2d 266, 508 P2d 
532 (1973) ^  and other, cases, for^the proposition that before the 
plaintiffs can accelerate the balance due under a promissory note 
they must give the defendants notice of default and a reasonable 
amount of time in which to bring the contract current. 
A careful reading of the LaMont case is necessary to set in 
perspective the rules of law it discusses. The decision concerns 
a Uniform Real Estate* Contract, and the Court's holding was: 
"It appears that the plaintiffs failed to establish 
that they gave noti,ce to the defendants of their 
election to trea't the contract as a note and mortgage 
prior to full tender of the amount due. Besides the 
defendants were not given a reasonable time in which 
to make good the delinquent installment.0 
(emphasis added) 
Under the facts of the LaMont decision, it appears that the 
defendants tendered the amount due prior to the election of 
plaintiffs to declare the entire amount due and payable. (The 
court cited Romero v. Schmidt, 15U2d 300,392 P2d 3J 1964) and 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation vs. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161 P2d 
355, (1945)). 
The court also noted that the default was overlooked by all 
parties'for some fifteen months, and impliedly suggests that this 
may work an estoppel or waiver on the contract being declared to 
be due and owing. y 
There are several reasons why the law applicable to Uniform 
Real Estate Contracts has no bearing upon this case. 
Fi^ rst of all, this case does not deal with any forfeiture of 
interest nor does it* deal with the foreclosure of real property or 
other collateral. The sellers were not attempting to penalize the 
buyers by taking property in which the buyers had established an 
equity. When a plaintiff is not seeking the harsh remedies avail-
able under a Uniform Real Estate Contract, it makes no sense to 
afford the defendants all of the protection given to reduce inequit-
able forfeitures and foreclosures. 
The California case of Messner v. Mallory, 236 P2d 898 (Cal. 
App. 1951) points out this fact.clearly. In this case the seller 
had sold to the buyers, his interest in an automobile dealership 
and as part of the transaction the buyers executed a promissory 
note in the amount of $25,000.00 to the seller, a retiring partner* 
The payments were to be made on th$ 1st day of each month commencing 
on the 1st day of September, 1949. Each continuing partner was to 
pay $200.00 per month. One of the partners made his payments reg-
ularly but the second partner's payments were late for five of the 
nine months the contract was in existence. One partner's check 
for the June, 1950, payment was made on time but the other partner's 
payment was late. On June 5, 1950, the seller sent a letter to both 
buyers declaring the entire balance due and payable. Subsequently, 
on the 7th day of the month the seller refused the buyer's tender 
of his check. 
• • • . • * 
• ' • » . ' • 
The buyer argued that the exercise of the acceleration clause 
o 
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by the seller amounted to a forfeiture and that the seller had 
waived his right to declare a default and was estopped to do so, 
and that the court should reform the contract to relieve the buyers 
of any default. The court heard the arguments and held that the 
seller was entitled to accelerate payments. The court stated: 
"A provision in an agreement for accelerated 
maturity is not in the nature of a penalty 
or forfeiture, but simply an agreement as 
to the time when a debt shall become due and 
enforceable according to its terms. Such an 
agreement is a lawful one which the parties 
may enter into and when they do so the con-
ditions will be enforced by courts of equity. 
No forfeiture is involved in such act, and 
no penalty imposed. Plaintiff is not asking 
for anything that has been paid under the 
contract by way of forfeiture, but is simply 
refusing to extend credit for the reason that 
the defendant has failed to comply with his 
contract. The situation is entirely differ-
ent from an agreement of sale wherein, upon 
failure of payment of an installment the 
vendor is attempting to retain payments made 
and also the property itself, the subject of 
the sale." 
The Washington Court has also examined this question and 
in*Jacobson v^ McClanahan, £3 Wash 2d751,264P2d253 (1953) the 
court discussed the difference between acceleration and for-
feitures and stated: 
"Equity abhors forfeitures and penalties, 
but acceleration of payments on a mortgage 
is not a 'forfeiture' or a 'penalty'". 
Utah courts have also upheld acceleration clauses as 
being valid. See Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. Neilsen, 
26U2d383,490P2d328(1971). 
-6 
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Several other jurisdictions have also upheld acceleration 
clauses as being valid and enforceable against a defaulting creditor. 
(See: Baltimore Life Insurance Company v. Harn, 1^ Ariz. App. 78, 
486 P2d 190, Review denied 108 Ariz. 192, 494P2dl322 (1971); Federal 
Nat. Mortgage Assfn v. Walter, 363 P2d 293 (Okl. 1961); Puget Sound 
Mut. Sav. Bank v. Lillions, 50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P2d 935, Cert, 
denied, 357 U. S. 926,2 L.Ed.2d 1371,78 S.Ct. 1373 (1957). 
From a practical viewpoint this controversy resolves itself 
around the question of who ought to bear the costs of financing the 
credit remaining to be paid on the promissory note. If the Court 
agrees with the sellers -the only damage the buyers will entail will 
be the* costs of refinancing the note and paying it off at once. If 
the Court holds for the buyers, the sellers will be required to 
extend credit to the buyers. The evidence clearly shows the 
buyers were repeatedly late, the records showing 15 late pay-
ments out of the 25 made, and the buyers were notified twice by 
telephone calls and"once by letter from an attorney that payments 
must be made on time. By enforcing the terms of the npte the 
Court Is not penalizing any interest of the buyers, but the 
Court is merely enforcing the terms of an.agreement which the 
buyers signed and agreed to be bound to. After the buyers failed 
to pay the payments as they agreed to do, the sellers were entitled 
to ask for the total money due them. The sellers are merely 
asking that someone else extend credit to the buyers for the reason 
i m-
-7- '. '*' 
that the buyers have failed to honor their agreement and have failed 
to comply with the contract by making timely payments. 
As is pointed by the California court, in Messner, the 
sellers in this action are not asking for a forfeiture of any 
interest of the buyers. The sellers are merely asking that the 
agreement, signed by the parties be enforced. That agreement being 
that if the sellers "failed to make timely payments on the promissory 
note that the whole note would become due and.payable at once. 
As the Arizona Court pointed out in Baltimore Life Ins. Co. 
v. Ham, supra, ffacceleration clauses" are bargained for elements 
of mortgages and notes, after the repeated delinquent payments 
by the buyers, the sellers are entitled to have the terms of their 
agreement upheld. 
Secondly, the buyers on two separate occasions waived any 
protection such rules of law may have afforded them. First off, 
in signing the note the buyers agreed that they would "waive any 
notice of non-payment". After waiving the notice requirement, by 
signing the note, the buyers are now seeking to have this Court 
enforce against the sellers the very requirements for notice which 
they previously waived. v 
In addition the buyers further waived any notice requirements 
when they stipulated that the action would be tried strictly on 
the enforceability of the acceleration clause of the installment 
note. The parties agreed that the one-action rule, if it had any 
application, would be waived and that the collateral secured by 
the note would not be foreclosed. 
By waiving their right to make the sellers undergo foreclosure 
proceedings the buyers also waived the protection such proceedings 
might have afforded them. They certainly are not entitled to 
keep the collateral which secured the promissory note, and at the 
same time insist upon the rules of law which apply to forfeiture 
proceedings under the Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
Thirdly, after the buyers waived any application the one-
action rule might have afforded them and after they stipulated that 
the suit would be tried on the enforceability of the acceleration 
clause, the cause of action resolves itself around the rules 
governing promissory notes. 
Promissory notes are now governed by the provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Under the Utah Code Anno. 
§70A-3-104 (Repl. Vol 1968) it is clear that Plaintifffs Exhibit 
No. 2, the installment note, is a negotiable instrument as defined 
by the Commercial Code. Utah Code Anno. §70A-3-122 (Repl. Vol. 
1968) provides that a cause of action against the maker accrues 
on the day after maturity. Since the note provided for monthly 
payments the sellers would have a cause of action accrue on the 
2nd day of each month if the payment was not paid on the due date, 
0 
the 1st of each month. When dealing with promissory notes there 
is no notice and other requirements to be complied with as are 
necessary when dealing with Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
-9-
The Lamont case itself points this out. One of the reasons 
for the necessity of notice of default is that several options 
are available to a seller under Uniform Real Estate Contracts, 
and a mere failure to pay does not make the debt due, but affirmative 
action by the seller must be taken to declare the whole debt due. 
However, with promissory notes the debt becomes due "the 
day after maturity". This is particularly so where the buyers 
"waive notice of non-payment". 
Thus, the rules applicable to Uniform Real Estate Contracts 
do not apply to this case, since it involves a promissory note, and 
since the buyers have waived any right they may have had to such 
protection. 
' POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT 
THE RULES DEALING WITH FORFEITURES AND 
FORECLOSURES OF UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CON-
TRACTS SHOULD APPLY TO THIS CASE, THE 
BUYERS RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF SUCH PROTECTION. 
The evidence before the court shows that the sellers received 
late payments on 15 of the 25 payments made but the sellers never 
acquiesed in or accepted the late payments. The evidence is clear 
that at least on two occasions Mrs. Williamson told Mrs. Wanlass, 
that payments were to be made on time. The evidence also shows 
that on February 20, 1973* a letter was sent by Charles P. Olson 
(see PI. Ex. #3) notifying the defendants that their late payments 
were inconveniencing the Williamsons and that the Williamsons "have 
certain remedies under their contract such as declaring the full 
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amount due and payable, which, if they are aggravated, they will 
pursue". 
Again PI. Ex. #4 dated August 3, 1973, gave notice that pay-
ments were late and that the sellers were exercising their rights 
of acceleration. 
There is no evidence that the plaintifffs lead the defendants 
to believe that they would not require timely payments, so the 
plaintiffs4could not be estopped to demand timely payments. Also, 
there is nothing to indicate the sellers waived timely payments. 
Since the sellers were not a financial institution but only 
individuals selling a farm it is hard to conceive of what better 
notice the buyers could have received to notify them that payments 
would have to be made on time. 
There is no question that the buyers had received notice 
on at least three separate occasions that payments must be made 
when due, before the note was accelerated. 
Under the test laid down by LaMont, supra, and other cases 
dealing with Uniform Real Estate Contracts it is clear that these 
buyers repeatedly received notice that acceleration would take 
place if payments were late. * 
The July payment and August payment were not mailed until 
August 7, 1973. 
In view of the fact that acceleration took place several 
days before the payments were mailed, and in view of the fact 
that the buyers were over a month late, the requirements to de-
-1X~\ 
clare an option and a reasonable time to pay were met and the 
buyers were obligated to pay the entire note. 
This is particularly so when no forfeiture or foreclosure was 
involved, when the parties were private individuals, and when the 
buyers had waived their rights to such protection. 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AND THE 
DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED." 
The July payment was never received by the sellers. The 
buyers claimed that they had mailed the payment to the sellers, 
which claim was the only evidence that a payment had been mailed. 
However, the history of paying showed that on several occasions 
they were three months late in making payments. The check and 
envelope were never found and they were never returned to the 
buyers. From this the Trial Court could certainly draw a reasonable 
inference that the check was never mailed. 
The buyers own check stub (Def. Ex #20) shows that the check 
which was supposed to have been mailed for the July 1, 1973 
payment was not dated until July 9, 1973, which would be at least 
9 days late when made, by the evidence most favorable to the buyers. 
The August payment was in an envelope post-marked August 
7, 1973 (see PI. Ex #8) the same day Mr. Wanlass, the buyer, 
claimed to have received notice of acceleration, and the check 
inside the envelope shows that the check was dated August 1, 1973. 
• ' . . ' • ' ' • . f • 
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(PI. Ex. #8). Therefore, the date of a check would not have any 
bearing upon the day the check may have been mailed, in fact the 
buyers admitted the date of a check and the date mailed wouldn't 
be the same date (T.100). 
The notice of acceleration (Pi. Ex. #3) was mailed on August 
3, 1973 but the defendant claims he didn't receive it until August 
7, 1973f and he further claims that he mailed his August payment 
before getting the notice, even though the envelope containing the 
payment was post-marked on August 7f 1973, (see PI. Ex. #8) the 
date the notice was admitted to have been received. 
The trial court was able to see the demeanor of the witnesses 
and was able to see the seemingly conflicting statements of the 
buyer together with the tangible exhibits. The trial court was 
in a favorable position to determine the credibility of witnesses 
and testimony. His decision should not be disturbed unless it is 
against the weight of the evidence. 
In this case the appellants attempt to relate the facts most 
favorable to their position; but, there is sufficient information 
* to support the findings and judgment of the Trial Court. The Trial 
Court's decision and judgment should not be overturned if there is 
sufficient evidence together with reasonable inferences to support 
the judgment. Numerous cases have held that the Utah Supreme 
Court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustain 
the lower court's decision and the lower court's findings will 
not be disturbed unless they fairly manifest against the weight 
^13-
of the evidence or clearly indicate the Court misapplied the law 
to the established facts. 
Utah cases stressing this point are extremely numerous. See 
First Security Bank of Utah N. A. v. Wright, 521 P2d.563 (1974); 
Howarth v. Ostergard, 30 Utah 2d 183,515P2d 444(1973); Barrett v. 
Vickers,24 Utah 2d 334, 471 P2d 157 (1970). 
The evidence together with the reasonable inferences there-
from is certainly sufficient to support the Trial Court's findings 
o 
that the July and August payments were not made until after August 
7, 1973, the day the defendants received notice the contract was 
accelerated. 
, POINT IV 
IF THE- COURT SHOULD DETERMINE 
THAT THERE IS COMPELLING EVI-
DENCE TO BELIEVE THE JULY PAY-
MENT WAS MAILED THE RISK OF LOSS 
FOR NON-DELIVERY STILL RESTS UPON 
THE BUYERS. 
As was pointed out previously there is sufficient in-
' • • . . ' • 
formation from which the Trial Court could have found or could 
% have based a reasonable inference that the July payment was never 
mailed. . 
However, even if the Court should find that the July payment 
was mailed, the risk of loss falls upon the buyers. As stated in 
60 AM Jur 2d, "Payments" 17. The general rule for determining 
risk of loss through the mail is as follows: 
• -14- •,' 
"An obligor is bound to pay his obligee in 
person or by agent, and does not discharge 
his obligation merely by making all reason-
able efforts to transmit to the obligee the 
amount due him. An obligor cannot select 
his obligee's agent to receive payment, even 
if he selects the United States mails or 
other public carrier. Therefore, depositing 
in the mail a letter containing money and 
addressed to the obligee does not discharge 
the obligation if the remittance is not 
received by the obligee, unless the obligee ' 
has expressly or by implication directed or 
consented that payment be so made. Stated 
in another way, in order to absolve a debtor 
who transmits money by mail to his creditor 
for the payment of his debt from the hazard 
of loss in the transmission, it is necessary 
that he show authority from the creditor to 
to remit in this manner, or a usuage or 
course of dealing from which such authority 
may be inferred." 
A California case, Blumer v. Kirkman Corp., 24lP2dl7 (1952) 
also discusses this general rule and states: 
"Payment is not effectuated by sending the 
amount due to the creditor by mail or other 
public carrier until the remittance gets into 
the hands of the creditor, unless he expressly 
or by implication directs or consents that 
payment be sd made ***. A mere general dir-
ection by a creditor to his debtor to remit 
4 money to him ordinarily does not constitute 
a direction or consent that remittance be 
made by mail at the creditor's risk ***#tf 
70 C.J.S.,Payment, s 7, p. 218. 
The question appears to be whether the Williamsons "expressly 
or by implication" directed or consented that payment be made by 
mail." 
In determining this question a look at PI. Ex. #2 shows 
that payment was to have been made at Hyrum, Cache County, Utah. 
' - 1 5 - '•' 
There is nothing to show an "express" consent to receive payments 
by mail. The buyers argue in their brief that a "course of 
performance" was established by the parties and therefore the 
plaintiffs by "implication" consented to payment by mail. 
However, under Utah Code Anno, s 70A-2-208 (Repl. Vol. 
1968), the course of performance must be "accepted or acquiesed in 
without objection". The evidence is clear that most payments were 
mailed late. However, the plaintiffs objected to late payments on 
at least three occasions and therefore no "implied consent" could 
be inferred sufficient to put the loss of payment on the sellers 
for the reason that the sellers were objecting to payments which 
were made by mail. > 
As a practical matter the sellers did not care by what mode 
payments were made by the buyers, but they did want them on time. 
The testimony of the Williamsons was that they wanted to be paid 
on the due date, and that they were not going to accept late pay-
ments. 
After the sellers insisted upon the payments being timely 
made, the buyers, who had been making late payments by mail, could 
not then claim that the sellers had accepted payments without 
objection. The buyers were aware that payments were required to 
be timely made. After the buyers had been put on notice that the note 
would be accelerated if payments were late, the buyers then were 
required to bear the risk that the U.S. mails might be late in \ 
delivering payment and that the payments could be lost. By in-
-16-
sisting on timely payments the sellers refused to make the UQ S# 
mail their agent. And the sellers accepted the risks of delay 
or loss by using the mail after being notified that the sellers 
were insisting on timely payments. 
POINT V 
• 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS FREELY 
SIGNED BY THE BUYERS AND THE 
NOTE SHOULD BE ENFORCED AGAINST 
THEM. 
The buyers attempt to relieve themselves from the terms of 
the promissory note, on the basis that both parties relied upon 
the same attorney, is totally spurious. 
The attorney the buyers are claiming failed to adequately 
represent them was one of the leading attorneys of Logan prior to 
his recent, untimely death. At the trial the attorney testified 
forthrightly and candidly and his testimony covered thirty-two 
pages (T. 3-42) . There is not one thing in his testimony or that 
of any other witness to indicate that Mr. Olson did anything im-
proper or failed to represent the buyers. 
The buyers claim that they should somehow be relieved from 
the acceleration because Mr. Olson did not represent them solely 
is totally unfounded in both the law and the facts. Mr. Wanlass1 
(buyer) own testimony was that he didnft think he could excuse 
himself from the terms of a note'he signed (T.110)* < 
The buyers also argue that acceleration can only take place 
in good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired; 
• » . , ' . . - . ' • • / 
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This is true under the Commercial Code, Utah Code Anno, s 70A-
1-208 (Repl. Vol. 1968), but it refers only to acceleration 
clauses based on Mat will" or "when deemed insecure". Sec. 70A-1-208 
dealing with "at will" clauses has no application to this note. ' 
As the California Court stated in Messner v. Mallory, supra: 
"A provision in an agreement for accelerated 
maturity is not in the nature of a penalty or 
forfeiture, but simply an agreement as to the 
time when a debt shall become due and enforce-
able according to its terms. Such an agreement 
is a lawful one which the parties may enter into 
and when they do so the conditions will be en-
forced by courts of equity. No forfeiture is 
involved in such act, and no penalty imposed. 
Plaintiff is not asking for anything that has 
been paid under the contract by way of forfeiture, 
but is simply refusing to extend credit for the 
reason that the defendant has failed to comply 
with his contract. The situation is entirely 
different from an agreement of sale wherein, 
upon failure of payment of an installment the 
vendor is attempting to retain payments made 
and also the property itself, the subject of 
the sale." 
CONCLUSION 
There has been no showing in appellants brief that the 
^Trial Court had misapplied either the law or the facts in this 
case. 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that the case law dealing 
with Uniform Real Estate Contracts has no bearing, since this is 
a case dealing with a promissory note and since the buyers waived 
their rights and agreed that the matter could be tried without any 
foreclosure of property. 
In addition, the buyers were'repeatedly notified to make 
• -18* ;' 
their payments when they came due. 
The sellers are not trying to forfeit or foreclose any 
interest of the buyers, they are merely asking that the terms 
of the agreement be enforced. 
From all of the evidence it is clear the buyers are the 
parties in default and the sellers are the innocent party. ' 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court's 
decision and judgment be affirmed together with costs awarded 
to the respondents. 
[ i RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
» M 
i Walter G. Mann 
i » . y ' 
r : •• \ _ _ _ 
Jeff R. Thorne 
Attorneys for Respondents 
i f: 
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